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THE SUPREME COURr OF THE
STATE

OF

UTAH

KATHIE ADELL MUNFORD,

Plaintiff and
Appellant
vs.
RAYMOND G. MUNFORD,

Defendant and
Respondent.

.
..
..
..
..
..

case Number 18088

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE

This case is a divorce action carm:mced by Plaintiff in the
District Court of M:>rgan County.

About 6 -weeks following the trial

and the Courts decision in the case, APPELIA.W filed a lt>tion under
Sec;tion 30-3-5

utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, seeking a

reconsideration or m::xli.fication of the Courts Judgerrent or Decree
on the property question.

DISPOSITIOO IN THE u:MER COURT

After a hearing, with evidence presented and argurrent of counsel,
the lower Court denied APPELIANT'S lt>tion.
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RELIEF SOOGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant requests that APPEIJ.J\NT'S appeal be dismissed, and
that the Judgement and ruling of the ID\\er Court be affinned.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On

or about January 14, 1981, without the knowledge or pennission

of Defendant, Plaintiff left Defendant and his three children of a
prior marriage, and took her tv;o children (of a prior marriage, which
tv;o children had been adopted by Defendant), along with many items of
personal property and fcxxl storage, etc. (R-12-14; TR-33-34).
The marriage between the parties had taken place arout 4 years

prior to this time, and Plaintiff had rroved into the home of Defendant,
which had been previously aCXIUired by him.
The Parties had their problems and difficulties in trying to
reconstitute 2 separate families during the 4 year period, but
Defendant was unaware of Plaintiff's intentions to leave him (R-14;
TR-33-34).
The Parties \\ere having a very difficult time meeting all their
obligations and expenses by reason of the recession, especially in the
car business, 'Which Defendant was engaged in, and Defendants rconthly
incane about that time was less than his monthly outgo {about
$1,300.00 Gross incare and about $1,600.00 minimt:nn expenses), (R-15-16).
About December 15, 1980, a month prior to Plaintiff leaving
Defendant, said Defendant made application to l:x:>rrow $23,000.00 fran
his credit union in order to help out on the bills and obligations
and to consolidate sare of their debts.

The hane of Defendant was

encumbered by a 2nd M:>rtgage for the $23,000.00 and the loan was conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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surrrnated on January 14, 1981.

~fendant

personally still

~s

and

is paying on this loan, and Plaintiff has no obligation (TR-79,87).
Plaintiff filed her Canplaint for Divorce against Defendant on
January 19, 1981, and anong other things she asked for an equitable
interest in Defendant's hare (R-1-5).
At the ti.Ire of the loan application by Defendant y,Tj_th his credit
union, about December 20, 1980, the credit union conducted an appraisal
on the Defendant's hare for the plllJX)se of the loan, and Plaintiff
was well aware of that appraisal and its plllJX)se, and she and her
attorney had a copy of the sane which was introduced by them at
the trial as Plaintiff's exhibit "P-H" (R-33,94).

Plaintiff and her

attorney in fact insisted on an additional appraisal done on the
hare for the trial, as the December 20, 1980 appraisal was done by
the "Credit Union for a different plllJX)se" (R-30-31).
From the tine of filing Plaintiff's Corrplaint, January 19, 1981
until the tirre of trial in ti.11is case, Ma.y 12, 1981, Plaintiff's counsel
did not serve any interrogatories on, nor take deposition of,
Defendant in regard to the case, t..11e assets, debts, etc.

However,

counsel for Plaintiff did express sare surprise on the 2nd r-Drtgage
for $23,000.00 at the tine of trial, whereupon Judge Thornley K.
Swan

states, "It ought not to, its been on, he says, he took it

out last December" - - - - "We have had all that tine to find out
about it, Mr. Vlahos" (TR-86).
It was Defendant's contention that the hare, having been acquired
by Defendant prior to his ·marriage to Plaintiff should remain the

property of Defendant, including the equity therein, as very little
had been paid off on the M:>rtgages during the marriage and Plaintiff
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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had put no rroney into it (R-13; TR-66, 70).

The Trial Court, however,

after weighing all the evidence and hearing the arguments of counsel,
and in its discretion, awarded $6,000.00 equity to Plaintiff in
Defendant's hare.
Plaintiff, by this appeal, is not satisfied with the WY.er Courts
ruling

.,:Jn

this particular issue and says the Trial Court has abused.

it's discretion.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE APPELI.ANT FAILED TO FILE HER APPEAL IN THE
TIME REQUIRED BY STATUTE, AND THE APPEAL SHOUID
BE DISMISSED.

It is not quite clear to counsel for RESPONDENT vtlether APPELIANT
is appealing the alleged abuse of discretion of the trial Judge,
Thomley K. Swan, of May 12, 1981, or the alleged. abuse of discretion of Judge J. Duffy Palmer, in the subsequent hearing on
September 3, 1981.
APPELLANT'S POINT I seems to go to the question of Judge Palmer's
abuse of discretion in denying the nodification or reconsideration
rrotion of September 3, 1981.

Yet the cases cited and the argurrent

by counsel appear to attack the decision of Judge Swan on May 12, 1981,
wherein, "The loan of $23,000.00 was never taken into consideration,
either at trial or in subsequent Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, or Decree, by the Court."

(That \\Ould be Judge Swan)

(APPELLANT' S BRIEF, Page 4} .
In either event, Plaintiff's appeal is not proper or well taken

and should be dismissed.
If Plaintiff's appeal is fran Judge Swan's Findings and Decree
in the Divorce action, which were entered in

t~:: ------.,
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1981, although signed by him on July 17, 1981, then Plaintiff has
failed to file her appeal in the one IOOnth pericrl of tirre pennitted
by Statute, as this appeal was not filed until September 17, 1981.
Col.lllsel for APPELLANT argues that his filing a r-t:>tion for
r.txiif ication or Reconsideration stays the tirre for filing the appeal
until after that matter is ruled upon.

However, counsel in his brief

admits that his Motion for lvbdification or Reconsideration was under
Section 30-3-5 utah Code Annotated.

(APPELLANT'S BRIEF, Page 4).

Rule 73(a) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, provides that
the running of the tirre for appeal is tenninated only by a timely
lt>tion made pursuant to Rule 50(b), Rule 52(b) or Rule 59 of' the
utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 50 (b) involves a Motion for

Judgement notwithstanding the verdict.

Rule 52 (b)

involves a

lt>tion to amend the Findings or to make additional Findings.

Rule

59 involves a Motion for a new trial or making new Findings.
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration or M:rlification was not
filed under any of the arove rules, but was filed for the purpose
of asking the Court to make other Orders in relation.to the property
distribution, "as may be equitable", under Section 30-3-5 of the Utah
Code.
It should be noted that the M:>tion for Reconsideration or lvbdification was filed by Plaintiff on July 2, 1981, (R-36) and yet counsel
for Plaintiff did not even sul:mit the Findings and Decree in the case
to the trial Judge until July 17, 1981, and they were not filed in
the Court until July 28, 1981 (R-38-43).
that h?r

~tion

was filed for

t~e

Thus, Plaintiff cannot argue

purpose of amending or making

5
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additional Findings.
It appears, therefore, that Plaintiff's

~ion

did not stay the

time for filing appeal, and inasmuch as rrore than one nonth expired
fran the entry of the Decree in the Register of Actions, {July 28,
1981) to the time of filing the appeal {September 17, 1981), this

appeal should be dismissed.
In the event Plaintiff's appeal is strictly fran Judge Palmer's Order

denying Plaintiff's r.btion tmder Section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code, said
appeal is also not well taken for the following reasons:
(a)

Plaintiffs M:>tion, Paragraphs 4 and 5, (R-36), stated in

substance that Plaintiff had made further investigation in regard to the $23,000.00 loan and the Court should set a date and
time for hearing further evidence and testinony that Plaintiff
would present.

Over the objections of Defendant and his counsel

Judge Pabner on September 3, 1981 did in fact allow Plaintiff to
put on further evidence, and then after full consideration, the
Court felt there was no basis for reconsideration of the Trial
Courts decision.
(b)

{R-1-3 of the September 3, 1981 hearing).

Under Section 30-3-5 of the utah Code, it provides:
- - - "The Court shall have continuing jurisdiction
to make subsequent changes or new Orders with
respect to the support and maintenance of the Parties,
the custody of the children and their support and
maintenance, or the distribution of the property
as shall be reasonable and necessary."

Therefore, Plaintiff has her remedy under this statute if and
when she can, by proper M:>tion, Affidavits, and evidence,
show the reasonable and necessary change of circumstances.
The appeal to the Supreme Court is therefore unnecessary and
not well taken.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT II
THE LOVER COOR'!' DID :NOI' ABUSE IT'S DISCRETICN,
AND IT'S DECISION SHOUID BE AFFIRMED.
The Trial Court, Judge Thomley Swan, took into oonsideration
all of the property interests of the Parties, including a full
consideration of the $23,000.00 2nd lt>rtgage, the payrrent of bills
and debts, etc. in making his discretionary Judgement and ruling in
this case.

The court also took into consideration the increase

and appreciation in value of Defendant's hane.

Thus, the cases

cited by counsel for APPELIA.l\fl' in his Brief are either distinguishable or not applicable to our situation.

In the Wooley v. Wooley case, 195 P 2nd 743; 113 utah 391,
cited in APPELIANT'S Brief, the Parties had lived together nore than
30 years and part of the funds both parties accumulated \Ent into
a speculative interest, and thus the Court held the wife was
entitled to a share of any increase in value of such speculative
interest.

In the instant case, the court did take into consideration the
$23,000.00 loan and Mortgage as

~11

as giving the Plaintiff a fair

and equitable arrount· fran the increase in value in Defendants hane,
even though the Parties had lived together only about 4 years.
Furthenrore, the Suprerre Court should not interfer in a Trial
Court's discretion in such cases unless there is clear evidence of
an arbitrary decision fran the record.

The t\looley case above cited is

good authority for the utah Law on this question.

The oourt therein

stated:
"The Supreme Court will not substitute it's judgeemnt in divorce proceedings relative to alirrony
and division of property for that of the Trial
Court unless the record clearly discloses that
the Trial Courts Decree in such matters in plainly
arbitrary."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(see also Allen v. Allen 165 P 2nd 872; 109 UT. 99, as one of the
leading cases on t1ri.s issue. )
The Smit.11 v. Smith case, 291 P. 298; 74 UT. 60, and the Glover
v. Glover case, 242 P 2nd 298; 121 UT. 362, cited in APPELLANTS
argument are distinguishable from ti11e present case in ti"lat one
of

b,e Parties in

t..~ose

cases had committed fraud or had failed to

fully disclose to the court what t.i."Leir true condition was as to
the property.· · In our case, Defendant fully disclosed to ti11e court
what the true condition

was as to t11e property and the r-hrtgages

o\<lng, and Plaintiff certainly knew or should have known, and had
plenty of time to determine all the facts as to t."Le property, debts,
etc. as was rrentioned by tJ1e Trial Judge (R-86).

Consequently,

there is no evidence of fraud nor evidence in the record to show
abuse of discretion by ti11e Trial Court.
Counsel for APPELIANT also cites Fletcher v. Fletcher (1980)
615 P 2nd 1218, a Utah case, wherein

t}ie

Trial Courts findings and

discretion -were in fact affirrred on appeal.

The Trial Court !'lad

considered in that case, as was also done in the present case, the
equity of

tx:Jt~,

parties to the action in any interest ti11e parties

may have acquired in the hare prior to the Divorce

~cree.

Judge Swan

fully considered and awarded Plaintiff an equitable interest in
Defendants hare based upon it's appreciated value during ti"Le marriage.
Where is the abuse of discretion?
The Utah Suprerre Court in ti,e Fletcher case also makes abundantly clear that on appeal

t~1e

Court wi.11 not

decision without clear evidence of abuse.

disturb the Trial Court's
The Court states:

"on appeal of Divorce Proceedings, The Supre..tre Court ·
will not disturb the action of tJie Trial Court
unless evidence clearly ~reponderates to the
contrary, or the Trial Court has abused it's
discretion, or misapplied principles: -~- -····~
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"In division of Marital property in Divorce Pro-

ceedings, the Trial Judge has wide discretion,
and his findings will not be disturbed lll1less
~'1e record indicates abuse tJiereof"
Again, there has been no showing of abuse in the record by either
Judge

Swan

or Judge Palrrer in

~us

case, and the Trial Court '·s

decision and rulings should be affinred.

CONCLUSION
In

as much as APPELLANT'S entire argurrent appears to go to

~"le

abuse of discreti0n of ti"te Trial Judge, Thomley K. S\van, and

the

~tion

for Reconsideration or .M:xli.fication cares under Section

30-3-5 of the Utah Ccx:le, Plaintiff's appeal should be dismissed,

as not having been tirrely filed.

In

t.l-ie alternative, the Trial

Judge's findings, Decree, and rulings should be affirrred and

~11eir

discretion in the property distribution in this case not be
disturbed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITI'ED this

sl
:J/- day of December, 1981.

CERI'IFICATE OF MAILrnG
I hereby certify that on the

si

JI-

day of December, 1981, I

mailed a true and correct copy of t..l'le foregoing Brief of Respondent
to Pete N. Vlahos, Attorney for Appellant, at legal Forum Building,
2447 Kiesel Avenue, O:lgen, Utah, 84401, i;ostage prepaid.
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